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A PASSPORT TO IDENTITY: THE DECLINE OF DUALITY AND THE 
SYMBOLIC APPROPRIATION OF QUÉBEC 
 
Richard NIMIJEAN et Anne TRÉPANIER 
École des études canadiennes de l'Université Carleton (Ottawa) 
 
Canadian society is now marked by a growing vocalization of a distinct identity. Politicians 
promote this identity to overcome tensions that remain, due to a failure to reconcile institutionally 
the often-contradictory claims that emanate from a plural society. We explore one aspect of these 
tensions: the decline of duality and a questioning of Québec’s place in Canada. While there has 
been a symbolic rearticulation of the importance of Québec in the new “Brand Canada,” this has 
not been accompanied by a corresponding “doing” of duality, thus not satisfying nationalist 
pressures in Québec. Symbolic and rhetorical strategies are often employed to deal with public 
opinion that resists dualism. As we demonstrate in the case of the new (2013) Canadian passport, 
the Harper government has chosen to symbolically address Québec’s claims; however, this reduces 
Québec to a historical part of the Canadian identity puzzle. While political pressures may be 
temporarily addressed, the historic pressures that inform debates about the Canadian identity are 
likely to continue. 
 
C’est un nouveau patriotisme canadien qui se fait entendre au Canada. Les hommes politiques 
semblent valoriser cette re-définition identitaire pour dépasser les tensions qui subsistent au sein du 
pays qui n’arrive pas à réconcilier les revendications souvent contradictoires des sociétés multiples 
qui le composent et qui mettent en péril l’unité. Nous explorons ici un des aspects de ces tensions : 
le déclin de la formule de la dualité et la ré-articulation de l'importance du Québec dans la 
rhétorique identitaire canadienne. Bien que l’on note une réintégration symbolique de la place du 
Québec dans cette nouvelle « image de marque » du Canada, cette démarche n’a pas été suivie 
d’actions pour prendre en compte l’origine historique de la dualité entre les deux sociétés, ce qui ne 
satisfait pas les demandes nationalistes au Québec. Des stratégies symboliques et rhétoriques ont 
été mises en place pour apaiser le grand public qui n’accepte pas que l’on fasse disparaître la 
dualité. Comme nous allons le démontrer en étudiant le cas du nouveau passeport canadien (2013), 
le gouvernement Harper a choisi de prendre en compte symboliquement les demandes du Québec. 
Cependant, cette politique minimise la part du Québec dans l’histoire du Canada en la réduisant à 
une simple portion du puzzle identitaire. Si Harper a réussi à apaiser temporairement les tensions 
politiques, les tensions identitaires liées à l’histoire des deux nations sont loin d’avoir disparu. 
 
 
How many times has the constitutional crisis been presented as the result 
of pressures arising from Québec nationalism – that eternal 
troublemaker – rather than as a confrontation of two nationalisms, 
whose visions are different and sometimes incompatible? (DUBUC 2002, 
64-65) 
 
The rise of Canadian patriotism and celebration of “one Canada,” rooted in the 
celebration of diversity and a perceived sense of shared Canadian values, has 
led to a seeming change in the Canadian identity. No longer a country 
populated by modest, reserved people, the new Canada that emerged in the 
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1990s was loud, proud and boisterous, one that previous scholars of Canadian 
identity would not recognize.1  
 
Can this be linked to a value shift in Canadian society? Much has been made of 
the impact of Prime Minister Stephen Harper and his policy agenda on Canada. 
He has shown a propensity to use symbols, values, and institutions to reflect his 
belief that Canada is fundamentally a conservative country in order to advance 
the Conservative political agenda and displace the Liberal Party of Canada as 
Canada’s dominant political force. Since assuming power in 2006, the Prime 
Minister has regularly claimed that Canadian and conservative values are one 
and the same, referring to the Conservative Party, which was only created in 
2003, as “Canada’s Party,” and Canada’s “founding party.” 
 
Harper has attempted to support these claims through a variety of symbolic and 
institutional initiatives that emphasize a Conservative reading of Canada and 
Canadian history (FRENETTE 2014). This also includes rewriting the citizenship 
guide (TONON AND RANEY 2013), politicizing Canadian history by renaming 
the Museum of Civilization as the Canadian Museum of History (IBBITSON 
2013; COHEN 2013), emphasizing military history (STARING 2013), and 
generally promoting the “royal rebrand” of Canada that highlights connections 
to Britain and the monarchy (BOESVELD 2011).  
 
This article examines an underexplored aspect of Harper’s symbolic and 
rhetorical politics: his reframing of Canadian duality, or the partnership 
between English and French-Canadians, that was an important foundation of 
Canada’s nascent national identity. In particular, it demonstrates how the new 
Canadian passport, issued in 2013, exemplifies Harper’s symbolic politics. This 
reframing, far from restoring duality, has contributed to the ongoing decline of 
Canadian duality and the continuing questioning of Québec’s place in Canada. 
The concept of “identity performance” is used along with the Canadian and 
Québécois political culture literatures to explore this identity shift.  
 
First, the article explores the historical development of Canadian duality within 
the context of the Canadian political culture. It then analyzes the emergence of 
brand politics and the growing emphasis on the symbolic. This has contributed 
to the decline of duality – by “speaking” of duality more than “doing” duality. 
                                                
1 David Bell (1992: 7) for example, notes how “classic” works on Canadian political culture and 
political economy focused on disunity and had negative and/or questioning themes that suggested 
the future of Canada was in peril. 
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The case of the 2013 Canadian passport is used as an example of the newly 
written demonstration of Canadian identity, one that absorbs Québec in a 
teleological historical framework and timeline. New insights into the Canadian 
political culture are gained by examining the identity performance of Brand 
Canada. Far from seeing the recent emergence of a new Canadian identity that 
informs the political culture, it is possible that the decline of duality reflects the 
disunited roots of the political culture (BELL 1992). 
 
Canadian Duality  
 
Duality is the partnership between English and French Canada that unblocked 
the political stalemate in pre-Confederation Canada. Rooted in the twin 
rebellions of 1837, reformers like Robert Baldwin and Louis Lafontaine 
advocated responsible government and promoted (limited) democracy through 
the encouragement of recognition of the particularities of French Canadian 
culture; the uniting of English and French reformers ultimately allowed for 
Confederation (GRIFFITHS 2002: xvii-xxiii). This outlook was reinforced by Sir 
John A Macdonald’s view that: 
 
No man in his senses can suppose that this country [Canada] can for a 
century to come be governed by a totally unfrenchified Gov-t [sic]. If a 
Lower Canada Britisher desires to conquer, he must “stoop to conquer.” 
He must make friends with the French; without sacrificing the status of 
his race or lineage, he must respect their nationality. Treat them as a 
nation and they will act as a free people usually do – generously. Call 
them a faction and they become factious (cited in GWYN 2007: 128). 
 
This reflects the view that Canada has managed to overcome the challenges of 
diversity, as long argued by John Ralston Saul (see SAUL 1997). This involved 
the development of institutions and policies that allowed divergent groups to 
coexist in order to survive and develop a sense of belonging to Canada as a 
nation, thus explaining why Canada has lacked for the most part political 
violence and sharp societal tensions present in other countries.2 In this sense, 
the emergence of a dualist vision of Canada can be seen as the foundation of 
Canadian democracy. 
 
                                                
2 As with any discussion of the creation of Canada, this ignores the impact of colonization on 
Indigenous peoples in Canada. 
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Consequently, Québec became quite attached to the significance of pre-
Confederation history. For Québec, the united Canada that emerged following 
the rebellions of 1837-1838 was the first “Canada” that it dealt with as a 
political partner. The forced unity of 1840 underlines the fact that Québec’s 
territory and language were appropriated for British Canadian history and for 
Canadian unity purposes.  
 
The survival of a Canadian identity, from a dualist perspective, has depended 
on continuous efforts to acknowledge Québec while simultaneously attempting 
to minimize the impact of phenomena that fostered tension in the country. The 
idea of Confederation, uniting communities with considerable antagonism 
towards one another, was powerful. By definition, confederation is a union of 
states in which each member retains some independent control over internal 
and external affairs. Confederation thus offered a political platform for the 
survival of French Canadian culture in Canada and the international recognition 
of its distinctiveness. Confederation was a binding force; it produced a sense of 
participating in something greater than the cultural nation, and yet for many it 
fulfilled the need for recognition and distinction from the US. The ideology of 
“survivance” thus came to reinforce the powerful concept of the French-
Canadian nation, and it was with this nation that Canada was co-founded.  
  
Despite the Confederation bargain, numerous personalities and events 
threatened this foundational dualism, aggravating the pain associated with 
memories of the Conquest, the quashed rebellions, and the Durham Report. 
Federalism and the promise of some power, especially in areas of language, 
religion, and culture, it was hoped, would restore historical justice. As Silver 
notes “French Canadians felt themselves to have different interests from those 
of other British North Americans” (1997: 34). Moreover, Michel Brunet 
(1969), the famous Québec historian, noted that despite the Conquest, the 
Canadiens did not give up their goal of surviving and flourishing as a French 
Canadian nation.  
 
Consequently, the power of the Conquest continued to affect the Québécois and 
their relationship to Canada. Eminent political scientist Léon Dion (1989: 287) 
described the Conquest as “the event that brutally altered the course of our 
destiny,” with the result that “the continent slipped out of French hands.” This 
ensured that Québec’s pre-Confederation history retained a significance that 
English Canada could not understand (DUFOUR 1997), something that has 
continued to the present. Thus, Québec’s 1995 Bill 1, An Act Respecting the 
Future of Québec, stated “The conquest of 1760 did not break the 
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determination of their descendants to remain faithful to a destiny unique in 
North America. Already in 1774, through the Québec Act, the conqueror 
recognized the distinct nature of their institutions. Neither attempts at 
assimilation nor the Act of Union of 1840 could break their endurance.” This 
attachment to history is the outcome of parallel historiographies that 
emphasized and interpreted key events differently.3 
 
An Evolving Canadian Political Culture  
 
The institutional workings of the union effectively gave birth to the two 
solitudes that, by the time of Confederation in 1867, would be rebranded as the 
two founding nations. A dominant province of Canada, which became (mostly 
French) Québec and (mostly English) Ontario, would join forces with Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick to form the new Canada. Because of the importance 
of Confederation for addressing tensions emerging from duality, French and 
English Canada would henceforth be seen by many as the pillars of the 
Canadian nation.  
 
Nevertheless, there were two very different definitions of nation at play. One 
involved citizenship and political nationality, while the other focused on 
ethnicity and culture. Henri Bourassa and the Bi-Nationalistes advocated for 
dualism, preaching equality and envisioning a bilingual Canada across the land, 
with a strong provincial government in Québec. In 1864, Bourassa stated “If 
the plan seems to us to safeguard Lower Canada’s special interests, its religion 
and its nationality, we’ll give it our support; if not, we’ll fight it with all our 
strength” (cited in SILVER 1997: 33). 
   
However, tensions were present from the outset of Confederation: the hanging 
of Louis Riel, Manitoba’s Official Languages Act, Conscription (in both World 
Wars), and Ontario’s Regulations 17 and 18 combined to make French 
Canadians more wary of English Canada. Underlying such events, as the 
sociologist Andre Siegfried (1907) noted, was a belief of English Canadian 
superiority and a fear of French domination. Consequently, Siegfried argued 
that the fact that French Canadians were conquered but not annihilated or 
assimilated meant that Confederation only produced “artificial unity.” For 
example, many English Canadian leaders saw the provinces as subordinate to 
                                                
3 Bell (1992: 92-95) notes that Québec history books and high school courses pay more much 
attention to the pre-Confederation era, while students in English Canada learn little about the era.  
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the central government, a view not shared by French Canadian leaders (SMILEY 
1967: 6-7).  
 
While Confederation has been widely understood and promoted as a historical 
mechanism for French and English Canadian partnership, it also inevitably saw 
French-Canadians go from being a successful minority in the Canada of the 
Union to a more reduced minority in the Federation under the name of the 
Province of Québec. Québec City was named the provincial capital of Québec, 
gaining symbolic status as the birthplace of the now French-Canadian minority. 
Arguably, it became not only the provincial capital relative to the Canadian 
federation; it also became the territorialized home and guardian, not without 
some resistance from French Canadians outside of Québec, of the French-
Canadian minority within the now wider Canada.  
 
By the 1960s, Confederation’s promise of equality and survival of a distinct 
French Canadian language and culture seemed an empty and distant memory. 
Québécois faced several obstacles to the development of their ambition. They 
were underrepresented in positions of importance in the Canadian public 
service, the French language was not used widely in Canadian institutions, and 
there were no formal mechanisms by which to promote their distinct language 
and culture. It is in this context that voices such as that of André Laurendeau 
rose to urge change. Canada had continued to treat Québec as a backward 
society and showed no signs of a willingness to change. The Quiet Revolution 
was brewing, and the Québécois, in a period of “refoundation” of their identity, 
were more and more inclined to self-define as belonging to a “nation” rather 
than to a “race” or a “nationality.” 
 
During the Quiet Revolution, many French Canadians, even within Québec, 
were not prepared to fully abandon a Canadian identity in exchange for a 
Québécois identity. Many still connected to the memory of a past where 
Francophones helped to build the colony, where their language and culture 
continued to shine in adversity (DUMONT 1993). It was amid this state of early 
and varied commitment to the realization of a Québécois nation that Pierre 
Trudeau’s brand of Canada, a multicultural Canada, emerged. Like the French 
“problem” seen by Lord Durham, Trudeau aimed to address the “problem” of 
French Canada and the growing nationalist movement without doing away with 
the Canadian federation. His solution was multiculturalism and a redesigned 
Canadian identity that was rooted not in history but in Canada’s exceptional 
geography and diverse citizenry. A multicultural Canada resonated with the 
large percentage of Canadians who identified as having distinct ethnic and 
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cultural backgrounds that were not British or French. While it did include a 
policy of official bilingualism, it did not privilege French Canadians culturally 
in the Canadian mosaic that it endorsed.  
 
Liberal visions of Canada involved the multicultural expansion of the “two 
founding nations” definition of the country. By creating official languages 
minorities and promoting multiculturalism, it further distinguished Canada 
from the American melting pot. This also transformed Canadian duality. No 
longer would it be rooted in historical ethnicity; instead, duality would be 
linguistic. 
 
Many Québécois authors have suggested that the ultimate goal of Pierre Elliot 
Trudeau was to undermine Québec nationalism. For example, Guy Laforest 
(1995) argues that Trudeau wanted to undo the framework of two solitudes that 
informed the evolving Canadian identity. Trudeau, he suggests, dreamed (sic) 
of tapping Québec’s nationalist momentum for the construction of a country of 
his own devising, making him a king of postmodern society expunged of its 
separate and, to his mind, pointless ethno-nationalities. 
 
Not surprisingly, this led to an alternative theory of Confederation: the equality 
of the provinces. The emergence of the neoconservative Reform Party (from 
which Stephen Harper emerged) in the late 1980s gave political weight to this 
view, for it had its own form of equality: Québec’s claim for special status, 
derived from the original compact theory of Confederation, was seen as a threat 
to the well-functioning of the federation (LAYCOCK 1994).  
 
In reaction to RoC’s emerging multicultural identity, Québec redefined itself as 
the birthplace of French America, sponsoring historians and a wave of heritage 
conservation to root its identity in a specific territory with a specific timeline 
that led teleologically to the effective independence of Québec. From then on, 
Québec not only grew apart from Canada and, consequently, from French 
Canadians outside Québec, it developed a distinct place in the international 
arena. In 1961, it opened a consulate in Paris; this was followed by the opening 
of consulates in London, Germany, Barcelona, Mumbai, and Tokyo. In 1976, 
the first Parti Québécois (PQ) government was elected, led by the charismatic 
former journalist René Lévesque.4   
                                                
4 Much has been written about René Lévesque’s charisma. Many saw him as the ideal 
representative of the Québec nation because he could relate to workers, given his life experience, 
but he could also use his language and communication skills to link Québec to the world. In his 
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Québec City was reconceived as a cultural national capital through the 1995 
creation of the National Capital Commission of Québec (NCCQ). This 
followed the very close referendum on the sovereignty of Québec that favoured 
the federalist option and left the independence movement torn and divided. To 
this day, Québec continues to be widely promoted as the cradle of French 
America. In fact, as recently as May 2012, the NCCQ published Québec, 
berceau de l’Amérique française, presenting the city as a national capital and 




While the fear of Québec separation due to the 1995 referendum stimulated an 
outpouring of affection towards Québec (“My Canada includes Québec” 
became a common refrain, and federal cabinet ministers orchestrated the 
Montreal Rally of October 27, 1995, bringing in people from across the 
country), former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien discovered soon after the 
referendum that there was little appetite for actually substantively addressing 
Québec’s claims in RoC (GREENSPON AND WILSON-SMITH 1997: 337-339). 
The only solution left was the rebranding of Canadian duality, which was 
similar to the brand politics that sold neoliberalism to Canadians (NIMIJEAN 
2005), emphasizing the articulation of identity and values rather than the 
“doing” that informs and shapes identity.   
 
The ongoing tensions between English and French Canada encouraged an 
emphasis on the neosymbolic. Thus, Chrétien’s Federal Sponsorship Program 
sought to “fly the flag” in Québec, in an effort to convince the Québécois that 
they could become attached to Canada if they connected with the symbols of 
Canada. However, in 2004, the Auditor-General of Canada noted irregularities 
in the administration of the program that produced a full-blown political 
scandal.5 That this strategy did not work, and indeed resulted in an increase of 
support for separation during hearings into the scandal, highlights the poverty 
                                                                                                        
work as a journalist, he often informed Québécois of complex global issues, effectively broadening 
the outlook of Québec and diminishing differences with “others.”  
5 The program became a political scandal as allegations of corruption and political favouritism were 
levelled against public servants managing the program and operatives of the governing Liberal 
Party. This led to a national inquiry headed by Justice John Gomery, who substantiated many of the 
claims of political involvement in the program and mismanagement. Gomery’s analysis is available 
at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/sponsorship-ef/06-02-
10/www.gomery.ca/en/phase1report/default.htm . 
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of an ahistorical and symbolic approach to constitutionalism that ignored the 
growing gulf between Québec and RoC.6 
 
In the wake of an era of intense constitutional negotiation and ongoing 
frustration, RoC fatigue grew. There was little appetite for embracing creative 
approaches that recognized Québec’s distinctiveness and its constitutional 
claims under federalism. For example, the last great effort to combine public 
policy with a recognition of not only Québec’s distinctiveness but also its 
constitutional rights, the Federal-Provincial Health Accord of 2004, was treated 
by one prominent journalist (GWYN 2004) as the arrival of “special status” for 
Québec: “Quebec now is special because, well, it is just special.” Indeed, public 
opinion in RoC was massively against the Accord due to Québec’s perceived 
preferential treatment, and was interpreted as a sign of RoC disapproval of 
“asymmetrical federalism” (SEIDLE AND BISHOP 2005).  
 
Canadian political analysis must always incorporate the challenges and tensions 
emerging from a binational – and increasingly multinational – country. As 
Dubuc notes in the opening quote, national unity tensions have largely been 
framed, in the majority English Canada at least, as emanating from the 
demands of Québec, and not as the tensions emerging from two competing 
nationalisms that formed Canada. He notes “how difficult it is for English 
Canada to accept the principle that part of the population can be different, and 
to formally recognize it - something that constitutes the very essence of respect 
for diversity” (DUBUC 2002, 74).  
 
One solution, as Phil Resnick (1994) earlier argued, is that English Canada 
needs to begin thinking as a sociological nation in order to understand and deal 
with the more nationalistic senses of identity of Québécois and Indigenous 
peoples living in Canada. It would also involve recognition from RoC that, far 
from being disinterested in federalism, a majority of Québécois are profoundly 
federalist, perhaps more so than Canadians elsewhere, as Balthazar notes:  
 
Les Québécois sont profondément fédéralistes, à une forte majorité. Ils 
sont probablement même les plus fédéralistes de tous les Canadiens, 
dans la mesure où le fédéralisme signifie le partage du pouvoir entre 
deux niveaux de gouvernement. Quand ils ont été tentés par la sécession, 
                                                
6 For example, Québec’s pro-free trade stance, supported even by many progressives, angered many 
in RoC for abandoning progressive values and undermining a sense of Canadian nationality (see 
RESNICK and LATOUCHE 1990). 
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c’est essentiellement en raison de ce qu’ils ont perçu comme la faillite 
du fédéralisme canadien. (BALTHAZAR 2006, 49) 
 
Short of this happening, it becomes easy for political debates in Canadian 
public life surrounding the question of language, official bilingualism, or 
respect for Québec nationalism to be framed as irritants that are unreasonable, 
impractical, or simply not necessary. For example, Official Languages 
Commissioner Graham Fraser criticized former Conservative Cabinet Minister 
John Baird for violating the Official Languages Act by carrying English-only 
business cards along with his bilingual cards. In response, his spokesman Rick 
Roth dismissed the allegation as “cheap political games” played by the media 
and opposition, an interesting response to a violation of the law for a “law and 
order” government (DE SOUZA 2013; RADIA 2013). Most recently, the Premier 
of Québec, Philippe Couillard, citing Canada’s two official languages, 
criticized Harper for appointing a unilingual (English) Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Rob Nicholson, to one of the most senior positions in government. 
 
These examples point not to the impracticalities of duality or the pettiness of 
the Québécois or French Canadians, but rather to the complexities of Canadian 
life and the necessity of hard work to live up to the ideals of the Confederation 
bargain with respect to duality. Prime Minister Harper himself, at one level, has 
engaged in such hard work. For example, in 2001, he wrote “As a religion, 
bilingualism is the god that failed. It has led to no fairness, produced no unity, 
and cost Canadian taxpayers untold millions” (HARPER 2001). A decade later, 
he has since proclaimed, “As prime minister, I think I’ve given more space to 
French than any prime minister in the history of the country” (cited in COHEN 
2012). This sets the stage for a new historical narrative, placing Québec at the 
beginning of the settler’s project, given Harper’s declaration that the Canadian 
state originates with Champlain’s arrival in Québec (COHEN 2012). 
 
Rather than addressing such challenges through institutions and policies, 
however, there has been an increasing tendency to promote a distinct Canadian 
identity as being rooted in national values. Thus, Chretien’s “Canadian Way” 
emphasized core values of tolerance and concern for the less well off 
(NIMIJEAN 2005), while Harper’s brand of identity emphasizes a masculine, 
muscular orientation that links strength with pride (RANKIN 2012). This leads to 
an emphasis on symbolism and communication of national identity rooted in 
political strategies (NIMIJEAN 2005, 2006a, 2014) rather than having national 
identity emerge from ongoing collective decisions negotiated between citizens 
and governments.  
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This has continued in the Harper era. Harper overcame many of his historic 
views and policy prescriptions by adopting an inclusive narrative of patriotism 
that on the surface recognized Québec. As noted in the new passport, Harper 
has embraced French as Canada’s first language and Québec City as Canada’s 
first city. While Canadian patriotism has been central to Harper’s political 
strategy, he has subsumed the Québécois desire for autonomy – whether inside 
or outside of the federation – into it.7  
 






In 2006, he introduced a federal motion that recognized the Québécois people, 
but not Québec itself, as a nation, thus undermining the territorial claims to 
duality advocated by Québec nationalists and the Bi-Nationalistes. He also 
embraced Québec’s arguments about the “fiscal imbalance,” labelled Liberals 
                                                
7 For example, “le Québec prend des forces” was the slogan in Conservative ads in the 2008 
election (see Image 1. To watch an ad, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XAHCGAMcHKk) 
and “notre région au pouvoir” was the slogan used in the 2011 election (see Image 2). The 
Conservatives have attempted to tap into conservative values of the land and the resentment held by 
rural Québécois against the large urban centres of Montreal and Québec City, thus reconnecting 
with the idea of a French Canadian and Québécois nationalism that could thrive within the 
Canadian federation, only because its definition of nation did not involve the state. 
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as “centralizing,” and demonized the Bloc Québécois as holding Canada 
hostage in an illegitimate coalition in 2008. He has thus adapted the language 
of Québec nationalism for his own political purposes. For example, Harper 
argued on la “fête nationale” in 2008 that he and his party were the “true 
nationalists,” stressing that a united Canada had room for “a Québec that is 








However, Harper has ignored the substance of Québec’s claims for full 
partnership in the federation. For example, in 2008, he reduced the claims of 
the Bi-Nationalistes to linguistic survival in the name of the greater common 
good: “Our federation was born of a desire by English- and French-speaking 
Canadians to share a common future, and it was built on respect for the 
language and culture of all Canadians. Linguistic duality is a cornerstone of our 
national identity, and it is a source of immeasurable economic, social and 
political benefits for all Canadians” (Canada 2008). That this is a revisionist 
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vision of history is not surprising, for minimizing tensions with Québec was a 
key plank of his “three sisters” strategy (see MILEWSKI 2011 for a description) 
to promote conservatism as the dominant force in Canadian politics. This was 
part of a broader strategy to use nationality, history, and symbols to rewrite the 
Canadian narrative in such a way as to minimize the significance of duality.  
 
Harper and Rebranding Duality: The Case of the Revamped Canadian 
Passport 
 
The new Canadian passport, announced in 2012 and issued in 2013, shows how 
Harper has rebranded duality. Since Canada does not have a program of 
Canadian national history, the new passport gives Canadian travellers a 
referential identity through a series of national images and symbols. The 
selected images illustrate the renovation of Canada’s representation of self with 
respect to the decline of duality. The Conservative program is clear: to regain 
and reclaim the identity of Canada as a moral leader despite Québec’s different 
value system, and protect its territorial unity despite multiple sovereignty treats.  
 
According to then-Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird, the new Canadian 
passport’s (officially an “ePassport”) “iconic images” make the new passport 
“more reflective and representative of who we are as Canadians. (…) Our 
government is tremendously proud of Canada’s rich history. We urge all 
Canadians to learn more about the events and people that shaped Canada and 
the great sacrifices made to secure our freedom” (Canada 2012a). Given this 
emphasis on narrative, especially since the government chose to focus on 
history, rejecting bureaucratic advice to focus on images of flora and fauna 
(RAJ 2012), we can examine images contained in the passport to explore how 
Harper has rebranded Canadian duality. 
 
The ePassport uses a postcard-like representation of Québec City as one of the 
sixteen Canadian appropriated symbols to decorate its pages.8 Alongside the 
eagle feather and the Inuit’s Inuksuk, the figure of Samuel de Champlain 
illustrates the rhetorical predator’s approach to identity construction and a new 
attempt at giving the Canadian nation historical roots. Monuments, landmarks 
                                                
8 The images and symbols in the passport are: Symbols of Aboriginal peoples; Samuel de 
Champlain; The Fathers of Confederation; The Last Spike, 1885; the Canadian North; Images of 
the Prairies; Halifax Harbour as a symbol of immigration; the Centre Block of Parliament; Niagara 
Falls; the Canadian National Vimy Memorial in France; Québec City; the RCMP; The Grey Cup 
and the Stanley; the “Famous Five” and Terry Fox; images of Canadians in war; Cape Spear as a 
symbol of Canada’s maritime history.  
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of Canadian regions, military history, and the monarchy have replaced the 
multicultural ethos emphasized by the former Liberal governments in the 
Museum of Civilization and in its citizenship guide. The new passport aims to 
equip every travelling Canadian with a miniature showcase of the country’s 
nationally and culturally diverse symbols, presenting Canada as a fun,9 
culturally diverse, approachable, and safe space. Minister Alexander stated, 
“Every one of the chapters that you see on both sides of me, of our history as 
represented now in our passport represent another phase of that diversity” 
(ALEXANDER 2013).  
 
The Harper government has therefore reinforced the narrative of Canadian 
history as a never-ending series of events and personalities that continuously 
add to the expanding definition of the Canadian identity noted by Minister 
Alexander. Any diversity defines this identity, thus diminishing the historic 
importance of Québécois and Indigenous peoples not only in the creation of 
Canada but of Canadian diversity. There is a decline of its mythical rhetorical 
duality and a vivid impression of the appropriation of Québec as but one 
component of a rebranded Canada alongside various other historical 
contributions. 
 
The ePassport constitutes an identity catalogue that reflects the decline of 
duality, even as it seemingly repairs Canada’s bridges to Québec and the 
Canadian Francophonie. This occurs because it teases out the specifics of 
Québec and appropriates them in a renewed historical Canadian nation. Along 
with other branded images, the passport presents a strong pan-Canadian 
national narrative based on diverse and easy to identify folkloric elements 
reinterpreted as Canadian values, and the cultural enjoyment of Canadian 
geography reinterpreted as our land and, ultimately, projecting a very peculiar 
sense of nation, one that is highly moral and unified both in history and in 
geography. 
 
Through the representation of symbolic images, the new passport introduces 
landmarks as overlapping criteria for belonging and identifying with the 
historical, regional, and symbolic elements of the Canadian identity. A common 
history and a unified territory form the core of this revisited national meta-
narrative. This is derived from crystallized images of heroes and founders, the 
                                                
9 Interestingly, when placed under a dark light, the images transform from staid images to bright, 
vibrant scenes celebrating or performing these symbols. To see how they appear see O’Connor 
(2015).  
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landscape, symbols of indigenous peoples, and images of Québec, all of which 
reflect heroic representations of strength, perseverance, and long-term 
determination. 
 
As shown in the passport, Canada as a place of national identity consists in the 
distribution of geographic space and symbols on a timeline. This resembles the 
strategy adopted by Québec as early as the 19th century – an epoch of 
conservative values. This identity matches the narrative line of a cultural group, 
one defined through history and geography, instead of the story of the plural 
identity that informed Canada. This evolving identity employed diverse natural 
and human resources that, while recognizing duality, embraced other forms of 
diversity, leading to a growing differentiation between Québec and the RoC. 
 
The inclusion of indigenous symbols, the representation of Québec City 
celebrating its 400 years of history, and the reference to immigration as a 
foundational Canadian experience (Pier 21) are examples of the creation of a 
more inclusive, albeit static, identification platform, both on the geographical 
and historical axis. These symbols help to define a unified Canada or reconciled 
nation, a nation that is “one.” 
 
Natural resources and traditional icons of the Canadian landscape are 
represented to demonstrate the extent, unity, and sovereignty of the territory: 
Niagara Falls, the Prairies, oceans, and Québec City, where the proposed 
colony of Canada was established in 1608. If the North is represented by the 
expedition of Captain Bernier and the West by the “last spike,” the Maritimes 
are represented by the Bluenose. Silencing the provinces’ denomination or 
attributes to return to a vision of regions with specific resources, perseverance 
in exploration and exceptional beauties reinforce the political and geographical 
unity of the Canadian identity and the current strategies over natural resources 
and land sovereignty. 
 
These selected images are indicative of the desire of Canadian unity made 
possible by a harmonized territory and a monumentalized heroic, peaceful, and 
statuesque history, invoking national symbols that transmit common values. 
Unlike national heroes like the Fathers of Confederation or the Famous Five, 
unlike national sport symbols like the Stanley and Grey cups, unlike the wars of 
Vimy Ridge or 1812, Québec City, Pier 21, and Indigenous symbols do not, in 
their essence, have a definitional Canadian quality. Their representations, 
however, are similar. Indeed, it is not the proper characters, immigrant stories 
or landscapes that are represented but the monuments to these, monuments that 
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were built by Canada or displayed in the capital, Ottawa. It is the 








This identity renovation effectively performs a rhetoric of unity rather than of 
duality. This began with a persuasion of the “Other” (Québec) via a rhetoric of 
seduction, where the Other is differentiated, and a third object is created 
(English Canada + French Canada = Canada). The Canada of duality was one 
consequence of that performance. However, a rhetoric of appropriation is now 
at play. The Other is no longer dancing with the RoC. The current rhetoric of 
appropriation diminishes the “Otherness” of the Other (RICOEUR 2004); this 
allows for the Canadian Unity performance to literally swallow Québec and 
make it part of the new Canadian identity for good. Rather than the Québec 
identity forming a constituent element of the Canadian identity, Canada is 
appropriating the specificity of Québec history and making it relevant to 
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Canada’s performance and reconstruction of its national identity, in which 
Québec is but one of many diverse elements.10 
 
History has become a new identity marker for Canada, and this includes the 
French language and culture; increasingly, Québec becomes a “cool” historical 
city to visit and the birthplace of the first Canada. It is part of “Brand Canada” 
and serves as an exotic, European, and “Big C” cultural destination that is 
different from the rest of Canada, yet an integral part of Canada at the same 
time.11 The French language is dominant in Québec but French is taught and 
spoken all over the country, even by the Prime Minister abroad. Instead of 
being something that fed Canadian duality, Québec is now part of a broader 
Canadian identity, an identity that differentiates itself from the United States, 
which gives a special flavour to this member of the Commonwealth. Extreme 
compatibility between Canadian and American cultures forced the English 
Canadians, after the fall of Britishness, to reconceive themselves in terms of 
other definitional elements. For a while, the “presence of Québec,” that is to 
say, the country’s linguistic duality, served this role. Given ongoing tensions 
between Québec and RoC, the rebranding of duality has served as the political 




The new passport effectively transforms Canadians travelling abroad into 
ambassadors of Canada. It allows Canadians to travel in the imagination of 
Canadian territory and time by flipping through its electronic pages while 
waiting to go through customs, making every citizen the owner of these 
symbols redefined as Canadian. The passport has not become a history book, 
even if it has a new diplomatic mission. National images that are both symbolic 
and pragmatic enhance our individual and collective security. Mirroring the 
                                                
10 In such a manner, the federal government can overcome tensions surrounding the decision to 
include the representation of Samuel de Champlain’s statue in the passport. Champlain’s true 
portrait is unknown, this specific statue is located in Ottawa, not in Québec City, and this statue is 
extremely controversial. The federal government’s referral to Champlain as “the Father of New 
France” and possibly the Father of Canada (Canada 2012b), by ignoring the tensions, diminishes 
the “otherness of the other.” 
11 For example, the Canadian Tourism Commission heavily emphasizes Québec’s cultural 
distinction – as a place with “French Canadian culture” – whereas other provincial descriptions are 
largely (though not exclusively) based on links to the land and “things to do.”  
See http://caen-keepexploring.canada.travel/explore/places-to-go#/exf-sortby/recommended/exf-
view/grid . 
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principles of bilingualism and multiculturalism enshrined in Canadian law, the 
passport “plays safe.”  
 
However, this denies Québec’s own performance of nation that proclaims a 
heritage of overcoming hardship to bloom into an open, secular, egalitarian 
nation that produces culture in the French language. In the Québec performance 
of national identity, the nation is simultaneously burdened by and free from 
past oppression; it retains its identity as a nation of “survivors” and works 
towards a new independence, as noted earlier by Dion and the preface to Bill 1.  
 
The challenge for Canada is to diminish tensions linked to Québec nationalism, 
both in terms of national unity and in terms of political pressures in RoC, while 
finding a way to embrace Québec’s distinctiveness, as it has sought to promote 
a distinct Canadian brand to the world (NIMIJEAN 2006b). Not only does “Old 
Québec” play an important role in French immersion exchange programs and 
family vacations, modern Québec and especially its cultural outputs in film, art, 
and music have become an important element of Canada’s presence on the 
world stage.  
 
While duality is central to a unique Canadian political culture and identity, it 
has also contributed to the ongoing fragile state of the Canadian political 
culture. Raney’s claim (2009: 6) that “the national unity crises of the past 25 
years no longer occupy central political stage in Canada” unintentionally 
reflects the tendency to use a RoC outlook on Canada. Québec and its claims 
for duality are only really noticed when the country is threatened. Similarly, the 
celebration of military history, highlighted by the celebration of Vimy Ridge as 
a formative event in the Canadian identity, ignores Québec’s complex 
relationship with the two World Wars (on Vimy, see MARTIN 2011). 
 
Thus, Harper’s broader political strategy necessarily contains contradictions. 
The challenge is how to manage tensions that are regularly expressed in 
Canadian public opinion surrounding Québec and official bilingualism. For 
example, a poll in Sun News (DUNN 2012) claimed that Québec was “coddled” 
compared to other provinces, whereas another revealed a majority view that 
bilingualism doesn’t unite Canadians and that most people in RoC did not feel 
that it was important to speak two languages (THOMPSON 2008). This poses 
serious political challenges for governments: how do you reconcile starkly 
different outlooks on issues that are fundamental to (dualist) visions of the 
country? The fact that Harper, in the 2011 election campaign, travelled with a 
huge Canadian flag as a backdrop for events and played the national anthem 
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before they started when in RoC, but only used a Québec flag and did not play 
the national anthem (canada.com 2012) when in Québec, suggests that his 
political motivations won out over any attempt to use the same symbols across 
the country, never mind develop institutions and public policies that reflect the 
Bi-Nationaliste spirit. 
 
Unlike Brian Mulroney who promised his party and RoC that Québec could 
become a partner with RoC if it was dealt with honourably (à la Macdonald), 
and thus staked his political career on the Meech Lake Accord, Harper has 
preferred a rhetorical and symbolic strategy that speaks to Canadian ideals and 
symbols that bridge diverse communities but has the effect of subsuming 
Québec in a redefined national narrative. Will this work electorally? It remains 
that the 2011 “vague orange” that saw Québécois massively support the NDP, 
shows no signs of abating as the 2015 federal election nears. Even with the 
collapse of the BQ, the defeat provincially of the PQ, and the removal of any 
immediate prospect of Québec separation, Québec is still very different from 
Harper’s Canada. As Louis Balthazar (1997) noted, Québec nationalism will 
not simply disappear, especially given the sense of “deep diversity” in Québec 
(TAYLOR 1991). If the unity issue is to disappear, it will be because Canadians 
have recognized and acknowledged this sense of difference by “doing” duality. 
Simply acknowledging duality through rhetoric or symbols – as in the case of 
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